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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold war, the international system configuration 
developed in such way that allowed different approaches concerning the reflection 
about the construction of peace. Albeit many efforts to transform violent conflicts and 
construct a sustainable peace, the persistence of violent conflicts throughout the globe 
indicates that these efforts are, at least, problematic. Consequently, a critical line of 
thought became more salient across peace studies. In this context, this article aims to 
problematize the construction of peace from both, a gramscian and foulcauldian 
perspectives. Hence, we will explore points of convergences and divergences in both 
theories in order to achieve a critical comprehension of peace. Ultimately, the main 
goal is to evince that the construction of peace within the international system aims 
the core’s maintenance of hegemony through the biopolitical power, exerted over the 
periphery. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Peacekeeping, peacebuilding and state-building efforts carried out by several 
international actors, and in especial those led by the United Nations (UN), have 
become pivotal elements of the current international scenario. Indeed, they constitute 
the very core of international policies in regards to peace, development and security in 
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our time. Nevertheless, this was not always the case. Indeed, this was only possible 
with the end of the Cold War. This is a direct consequence of the transformation of 
the shared international rationale in regards to peace: which went from the 
maintenance of a negative peace to the attempt of building a positive peace in the 
international scenario.3 
The present paper aims to explore whether the construction of peace within 
the current international system might be understood as the development and 
enhancing of an hegemonic understanding of the world being rendered operational 
through the exercise of a biopolitical power over post-conflict populations. Thus, it 
seeks to set the stage for further problematizations and future researches of the 
construction of peace in the international scenario departing from reflections of 
Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault. The paper is divided as the following: in the first 
place, in order to better understand the operacionalization of peace, we delineate how 
the United Nations approached peace throughout time; in the second and third place, 
it is intended to discuss both Gramscian and Foucauldian conceptual tools that could 
enable a problematization of the construction of peace as an attempt of fostering 
hegemony. These sections will discuss, respectively, the notions of hegemony and 
biopolitics. 
 
 
Peace in the International Scenario 
 
After the World War II, and during the whole period of the Cold War, the 
main UN activity related to international peace was peacekeeping; which usually meant 
the deployment of a small military force aiming just to monitor a ceasefire, or patrol a 
neutral territory between former combatants (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 4). Peacekeeping 
was usually a military force that acted as a sort of buffer between two states (Newman 
et al., 2009: 5). At that time, peacekeeping was reflected as a mere instrument of 
“conflict management, conflict containment or conflict suppression, dealing within 
symptoms and not concerned with fundamental resolution” of the conflict 
(Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2000: 5). Indeed, they were not concerned with 
transforming these conflicts or addressing their deep root causes. Therefore, these 
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kind of operations deployed during the period of the Cold War proven to be very 
poor at achieving the resolution of violent conflicts (Bellamy et al., 2010: 190).4 
In fact, quite often, this instrument directed to peace would find itself framed by 
the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War and used to maintain the international order. 
Indeed, peacekeeping often functioned as “a mechanism of great power management: it 
aimed to contain conflicts and prevent them from escalating, and to maintain stability 
so that a political solution could be achieved between states” (Newman et al., 2009: 6). 
Since the international order and stability, on the one hand, and violent conflict 
between states, on the other hand, were perceived, at that time, as the main objectives 
and challenges, respectively, in regards to the international scenario, the peacekeeping 
was usually deployed “to assist states to peacefully resolve disputes in their external 
relations between each other” . Therefore, observing the operations deployed during 
this period, “[a]lmost all the major operations of the Cold War represented the classic 
model of inter-state conflict management and few deployed in civil war situations” . 
These operations are the best example of what Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams and 
Stuart Griffin call “traditional peacekeeping” (2010: 173-174). Reflecting about the UN 
practices towards international peace during the Cold War, Edward Newman, Roland 
Paris and Oliver Richmond (2009: 6-7) highlight some peace operations that are 
emblematic of this period, for instance, the UN Emergency Force deployed to Egypt 
after the Suez War (1956-1967), the UN Military Observer Group deployed to 
supervise a ceasefire between India and Pakistan (1949), and the UN Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus (1964), among others.5 
It was only with the end of the Cold War that the nature of peace operations 
changed. Nevertheless, this modification did not happen in a vacuum. It happen in the 
international zeitgeist that emerged with the end of the ideological dispute, between 
the USA and the URSS. Without the Cold War ideological tension, and the adding 
triumphant spirit of the West – perhaps most iconic in Francis Fukuyama’s End of 
History (1992) – there was little debate about how the internal domestic design of the 
states should look like. Indeed, as an US State Department’s Deputy Director, 
Fukuyama was bluntly clear proclaiming the “end point in mankind’s ideological 
                                                          
4 For a more extensive delineation of the challenges and weakness of this kind of peace operations, see 
for instance (Bellamy et al., 2010: 190-192; Bercovitch and Dean, 2012: 82-83). 
5 For further missions of this kind, see (Newman et al., 2009: 6-7). 
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evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human governance” (1989: 4). The end of the ideological debacle brought an 
international zeitgeist where liberal democracy was understood by several international 
actors as “the only model of government with any broad legitimacy and ideological 
appeal in the world”6 (Diamond et al., 1990: x). This was clearly evinced, for instance, 
by Paris (2004: 20) when he remembers that, in the period of 1990-1996, more than 
three dozen of countries started to adopt liberal democratic constitutions of the first 
time. This fact raised the number of liberal democracies in the world from 76 to 118. 
At that time, there was little doubt that the states should all resemble liberal 
democracies . 
This rationale certainly reached, and started to underpin, the international 
policies directed to peace, especially the UN’s. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UN 
released an important document dealing with international peace – the Agenda for 
Peace (A/47/277). This document rapidly became a pivotal text regarding international 
peace in the post-Cold-War world precisely because it is there where the UN 
delineates its instruments directed to the construction of international peace, and 
because it is a document that very much clarifies the UN’s own understating about 
what peace is. These instruments directed to the achievement of peace at the 
international level became denser and deeper from this document onwards, and 
permeate UN publications regarding international peace from that time onwards. 
The instruments established by the UN are namely five: conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding7 (UN, 2008: 17-18). 
Conflict prevention is an instrument that deals essentially with “the application of 
structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and 
disputes from escalating into violent conflict”; it involves “the use of the Secretary-
General’s ‘good offices’, preventive deployment or confidence-building measures” 
based on “structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the 
factors driving the conflict” . 
                                                          
6 To be fair, Paris (2004: 21) remembers that this view of the world was not universally shared. 
7 It is worth to mention that the very name of some of these instruments is already present in 
publications of Johan Galtung (1976). This is, perhaps, a clear indication of the influence that reflections 
made within Peace Studies influenced the formulation of the document. In fact, the UN itself 
acknowledges Galtung’s and Peace Studies’ influences (UN, 2010: 1; 45). 
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 Peacemaking, by its turn, “normally includes measures to address conflicts in 
progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated 
agreement” (UN, 2008: 17). Apart from the Secretary-General’s ‘good offices’, 
“[p]eacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional 
organizations or the United Nations, (…) [or carried out even by] unofficial and non-
governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently”  The 
instrument designed as peace enforcement deals with “the application, with the 
authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the 
use of military force (…) [aiming] to restore international peace and security” . 
Another instrument is peacekeeping.8 This instrument is understood as “a 
technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been 
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers” (UN, 
2008: 18). Lastly, peacebuilding9 “involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the 
risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels 
for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and 
development” . It aims to address “the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent 
conflict” concentrating on “the functioning of society and the State, and seek to 
enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core 
functions” . These instruments are designed to deal with violent conflicts in their 
different phases of escalation. Notwithstanding, the clear-cut distinction between each 
of these instruments is not an easy enterprise and to precisely say where one 
instrument begins and the other ends on the ground is highly contested and subjective. 
In fact, these instruments may quite often overlap. 
 
 
The UN Peace as Liberalization 
                                                          
8 Peacekeeping is a highly disputed concept. For other definitions of the term, see for instance (Bellamy 
et al., 2010; Butler, 2009: Chapter 4; Diehl, 2008: Chapter 1; Diehl et al., 2010; Durch and Berkman, 
2006). 
9 For other definitions of the term and the different understandings of peacebuilding among different 
international actors, including within the UN, see for instance (Barnett et al., 2007; Chetail, 2009; 
Gourlay, 2009: 3-48). For an evolution of the concept within the UN, see for instance (UN, 2010: 45-
49). 
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The UN, after the Cold War, understood that in order to transform intra-state 
violent conflicts it had to pay attention to human needs and overcoming structural 
sources of violence (Bercovitch and Dean, 2012: 10). The UN answer to that was very 
clear, as early as 1992, in the UN’s Agenda for Peace when the organization perceived 
that it should “address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice 
and political oppression” (A/47/277). Therefore, the UN peace operations started to 
change, becoming less traditional peacekeeping operations and performing more 
peacebuilding activities.  
Nevertheless, one should remember that this transformation was not being 
implemented in a vacuum. An attentive observer should have in mind that, on the one 
hand, the post-Cold War period witnessed deployed peace operations performing a 
scope of activities within the domestic environment of ‘post-conflict’ states; on the 
other hand, one should not forget that this transformation in regards to peace 
operations activities took place within an international environment embedded in a 
liberal triumphant spirit that resulted from a sense of an ideological victory with the 
end of the Cold War. This certainly had an unquestionable influence in the kind of 
activities performed by peace operations and the outcomes expected from these 
activities. In such international scenario, where an atmosphere of a strong liberal 
triumphalism was experienced, it was highly shared that political and economic 
liberalism was the route to deal with several international issues, ranging from poverty 
and underdevelopment to violent conflicts.  
In such environment, to achieve peace in ‘post-conflict’ states meant to make 
operational the liberal peace argument there and, therefore, to liberalize them. Hence, 
the political, economic and social spheres of these states should be profoundly 
transformed in order to make them liberal democracies. Therefore, on the political 
realm was pursued the implantation of democratic regimes in these countries. This 
process, nevertheless, was underpinned by a very strict, and procedural, understanding 
of ‘democracy’. In this context, the democratization of ‘post-conflict’ states simply 
meant holding elections periodically; being the first one usually within the first years of 
formal peace. On the economic side, this meant the construction of an open-free-
market-oriented economy. This was pursued through several instruments ranging from 
the reduction of the state’s role within the economy to the stimulation of the free flow 
of capital and through conditional loans. On the social sphere, this meant the pursuit of 
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the construction of liberal society. This was attempted through practices that ranged 
from the promotion of human rights to the stimulation of the creation of civil society 
organizations. 
Indeed, Roland Paris makes a characterization of what would be the typical 
peace operation during the 1990s that it is worth quoting at length. For him, the 
“typical formula for peacebuilding” at that time, 
 
“included promoting civil and political rights, such as the right to free speech and a free press, 
as well as freedom of association and movement; preparing and administering democratic 
elections; drafting national constitutions that codified civil and political rights; training or 
retraining police and justice officials in the appropriate behavior for state functionaries in a 
liberal democracy; promoting the development of independent “civil society” organizations and 
the transformation of formerly warring groups into democratic political parties; encouraging 
the development of free-market economies by eliminating barriers to the free flow of capital 
and goods within and across a country’s borders; and stimulating the growth of private 
enterprise while reducing the state’s role in the economy. (…) [On the economic sphere,] 
[c]omprehensive marketization programs were usually initiated right away. (Paris, 2004: 19) 
 
Paris (2004: 19; Paris and Sisk, 2009: 6), in addition, rightly remembers that, at 
that period, the missions’ mandates, typically, tended to be limited in time. 
Furthermore, to him (Paris, 2004; Paris and Sisk, 2009), at this time, little attention was 
directed to the construction, or strengthening, of institutional structures inside those 
states. In very few words, one can argue that the major focus of these missions was 
the rapid democratization and marketization of the ‘post-conflict’ states (Paris, 2004: 
19). This rationale produced, in Paris’s and Sisk’s view (2009: 2), several destabilizing 
effects in different countries, such as: the elections serving as a catalyst element for the 
renewal of the conflict in Angola in 1992; the resurgent of not only war, but the 
occurrence of a genocide in Ruanda in 1994; the reversion of the democracy to a 
despotic form of rule by the elected officials in Cambodia in the 1990s, with Hun Sen, 
and Liberia after 1997, with Charles Taylor; the reinforcement of the power of the 
nationalist elements and the increasing of power of those operating in the black 
markets after the Dayton Accords; and the reproduction of the sources of the conflict 
in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala ; to name a few. 
All these elements indicated that the peace operations had to be rethought. 
Interestingly, rather than stimulating a pulling-back from the enterprise or the 
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rethinking of its underpinning normative framework, the failures and limitations of the 
early 1990’s peace operations brought the conclusion that more needed to be done, in 
terms of timeframe and the range, scope and depth of the activities performed. Hence, 
by the end of the 1990s, and the beginning of the 2000s, the peace operations were 
transformed. A pivotal conclusion drawn by those working on peacebuilding, including 
the UN was that peace operations need to be longer in time and a major focus should 
be directed towards the construction of governmental institutions in the intervened 
states (Paris and Sisk, 2009: 2). From the late 1990s onwards, the missions started to 
incorporate such concern and even those already on the ground were reconfigured. 
Observing the missions deployed during 1999, for instance Kosovo or Timor, one 
could clearly see that not only the missions’ mandates were much more expansive, but 
also that the institutional structures of the states became part of the interventions, 
most of the time the fundamental one . 
In a sharp contrast with peace operations deployed during the Cold War, peace 
operations of the post-Cold War world were different both in regards to the situation 
where they were deployed, and the activities performed on the ground. Indeed, most 
of peace operations deployed after the Cold War, especially from the end of the 1990s 
onwards, were deployed “into domestic situations – after or sometimes during civil 
conflict – and have involved some combination of tasks related to promoting domestic 
security, development and humanitarian assistance and strengthening governance and 
the rule of law” (Newman et al., 2009: 7). Therefore, observing peace operations 
deployed during the period from the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s 
onwards, what is quite noticeable is that, as a direct consequence of much more 
expansive mandates, the missions started to pay attention to a broader scope of 
activities. 
Indeed, from that time onwards, following security and development conceptual 
trends, peace operation missions became deeper and wider. Their mandates started to 
encompass activities beyond the provision of mere immediate physical security, the 
democratization through elections and the marketization of the economy. The newly 
reconfiguration of peace operations would embrace activities such as disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, activities in the realm of 
education, health, and basic services, the creation of institutions, the establishment of 
judicial institutions, the functioning of public administration systems, the creation of 
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political parties, the strengthening of the state’s capacity to provide services to its 
population, the very relationship between the ‘post-conflict’ state and its own 
population, and the promotion of a civil society (Paris, 2010). The most emblematic 
cases of this kind of intervention were, for instance: “Cambodia, Angola, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Sudan, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Kosovo, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia and Croatia” 
(Newman et al., 2009: 7). 
Therefore, observing current peacebuilding operations deployed to post-
conflict environments, what is perceived it that building peace is essentially the pursuit 
of the liberalization of post-conflict states. This liberalization is rendered operational 
through restructuring economic, political and social spheres of these states so they 
start to function as liberal entities. Nevertheless, rather than neutral or mere technical 
restructuring efforts, these practices can be understood as the fostering of one 
understanding of the world, and of how each one of these sphere should function, 
internationally. Indeed, this is an effort of fostering certain values throughout the globe. 
Not by coincidence, the process of building peace in post-conflict environments can be 
perfectly understood as the fostering and sustaining a hegemonic view of the world 
rendered operational through the exercise of a biopolitical power over post-conflict 
populations. In order to clearly understand the operation of this process, one should 
have a clearer understand of the notion of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci 
and the notion of biopolitics advanced by Michel Foucault. It is to the further 
delineation of both that this paper now turns. 
 
 
Gramsci and Hegemony 
Despite the regular misuse of the concept of hegemony nowadays, among 
scholars this notion has become almost synonymous with the Italian philosopher 
Antonio Gramsci. The works of Gramsci, and later Robert W. Cox and others 
(Arrighi, 1993; Cox, 1983; Gill, 1993; Morton, 2007; Robinson, 2006; Sassoon, 1987; 
Sassoon, 2000; Taylor, 2010), sought to develop a theory of hegemony that aimed to 
cover social relations struggles linked to a specific period of time, and importance of 
these social relations struggles to dominant political and social class formations.  
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  Despite the realist interpretation of hegemony grounded on a power state’s 
dominance over others in relation to their material resources (Joseph, 2008: 111), and 
the structuralists’ focus on a parallel reality beyond the visible actors (the structure) 
that impels domestic and international relations (through capitalism), we share 
Gramsci’s and the neo-Gramscians’ view that hegemony involves an inherent complex 
of social relations to explain the dominance of one group over another. But to fully 
understand Gramsci’s notion concepts in his theory, like civil society, state, and 
historical bloc, must first be interpreted. I regard of this, Bocock (1986) suggests a 
deeper division in Gramsci’s notion by separating it into three distinct, and inter-
connected, areas: economic; civil society, and state.10 But it is stressed that Gramsci, 
despite his preoccupation with the economic, was more concerned about the state 
and civil society areas (Bocock, 1986), and how they interact. This division has only 
one analytical purpose, which is to understand the complexity and variability of 
Gramsci’s interpretation of power relations. It is evident that any of these assumptions 
can be interpreted separately, but this must be done along with all the components at 
a particular juncture.  
According to Bobbio, the main distinction between Gramsci’s and Marx’s 
conceptualization of power relations and spheres of influence is related to the 
dichotomy between the relations of structure and superstructure. Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony assumes that ideology is more important than economics, and civil 
society (consensus) is more significant that political society (coercion). The central 
point of hegemony in Gramsci thus consists of a blend of philosophy and practice 
within political life (Gramsci, 1971), thereby reformulating Machiavelli’s duality of 
political practice, taking it as being the practice of coercion to formulate consent 
(Arrighi, 1993; Cox, 1983). According to Texier, however, presenting structure-
superstructure relations as being a dichotomy, inherently conceiving a dominant, is an 
equivocation. He suggests that there is a dialectical unity in which each may be 
conditioner or conditioned (Texier apud Mouffe and Sassoon, 2002) and not, as 
Bobbio suggests, mutually excluded. Portelli argues that Gramsci’s originality is 
                                                          
10 As he says: ‘Three major terms identify discrete, albeit interconnected, areas in social formation which 
form the baseline for the conceptualization of hegemony. These three terms […] are the economic, the 
state, and civil society. It is the emphasis which Gramsci gave to the state, or the political, and to civil 
society which distinguishes his work that from other major Marxist writers.’ (Bocock, 1986: 33). 
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precisely in overcoming this dichotomy with the concept of historical bloc, so 
addressing these questions of imposed primacy is worthless (Portelli, 1977). But there 
is one constant: it is at the superstructure level that hegemony performs. 
So for Gramsci the concept of civil society is characterized by socio-political 
forces that interact with its institutions in order to form their political identities, which 
are manifested by private institutions such as religion, schools, associations, political 
parties, etc.. Thus Gramsci’s definition of civil society would agree with Murphy, who 
says that civil society comprises “the political space and collective institutions in which 
and through which individuals form political identities … It is the realm of voluntary 
associations, of the norms and practices which make them possible, and of the 
collective identities they form, the realm where ‘I’ becomes ‘we’.” (Murphy apud 
Germain and Kenny, 1998: 7). This passage clearly illustrates how difficult is to identify 
certain points of social formation to explain domination, power and, in this case, a 
state’s power (hegemony) within the international system.    
Closely connected with the concept of civil society is the concept of political 
society, or the state, which, according to Gramsci, is part of the superstructure11 and, 
it is at this state level that civil society struggle occurs. By definition, state embraces 
both the use of violence (forces) and bureaucracies (legal system, education, public 
services, the press, means of communication, etc) (Bocock, 1986); in short, it 
represents what Lenin called the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, that is, it is through 
these channels of domination that the dominant class exerts its influence so as to 
maintain (or form) consensus. Hence, hegemony permitted Gramsci to enlarge the 
concept of state, leading to a broader and a more complex formulation that would 
include the major underpinnings of political structures in civil society (Cox, 1983: 51).  
                                                          
11 In order to show its relations, “What we can do, for the moment, is to establish two major 
superstructural ‘levels’: one that can be called ‘civil society’, which is the ensemble of organizations 
commonly called ‘private’, with the other being ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises 
throughout society, and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised 
throughout the State and ‘judicial’ government.”(Gramsci, 1971: 12). 
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The combination of all levels of society, e.g., political society, civil society and 
the economic would therefore form what Gramsci called the blocco storico or, as he 
says, “the structures and superstructures form an ‘historical bloc’, as he pointed out, 
“Structures and superstructures form an "historical bloc". That is to say the 
complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the refection of 
the ensemble of the social relations of production. From this, one can conclude: that only a 
totalitarian system of ideologies gives a rational refection of the contradiction of the 
structure and represents the existence of the objective conditions for the revolutionising 
of praxis. If a social group is formed which is one hundred per cent homogeneous on the 
level of ideology, this means that the premisses exist one hundred per cent for this 
revolutionising: that is that the "rational" is actively and actually real. This reasoning is 
based on the necessary reciprocity between structure and superstructure, a reciprocity 
which is nothing other than the real dialectical process”(Gramsci, 1971: 366)  
This notion of hegemony should involve all levels of society (Gruppi, 1978), and 
so for a revolutionary event to happen it is crucial that the political and civil societies 
organize themselves with a view to replacing the previously imposed order.  Cox 
(1983) affirms, however, that “a new bloc is formed when a subordinate class (e.g., the 
workers) establishes its hegemony over other subordinate groups (e.g., small farmers, 
marginals)” (Cox, 1983: 57). For a historical bloc to exist there must be a dominant or 
hegemonic social class (Cox, 1983) in conjunction with other agents, such as the 
political parties, the media, the church, the educational system, among others (Sassoon, 
1987). Notwithstanding the discussion about the effective power and influence of the 
US after the end of the Cold War (Arrighi, 1993), we believe that there is a consensus 
about its hegemonic power within the international system at the present time. 
Following this line of thinking, the above pre-requisite satisfies the requirements for 
the existence of other socio-political counter-movements which do, in fact, stand up to 
this hegemon. One of the goals of this work is to assess the search of a “transnational 
historical bloc” represented by international institutions, such as the United Nations 
and its peacekeeping/Peacebuilding missions, as being part of a singular and 
hierarchized concept of peace. The complexity of this approach is relies on, according 
to Gramsci, the proximity of this concept to the social class (re)organization, 
predominately attached at national level.  
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In spite of this, and given the natural degree of difficulty, there are at least two 
interpretations related to the possibility of transposing the national historical bloc 
formation to the international relations sphere and, consequently, of forming a possible 
“transnational historical bloc” in South America’s regionalism. The first scenario 
consists of a juxtaposition of member states historical blocs whose international 
interests converge to maintain or improve both the domestic and international 
hegemonic status quo. 
Of course this claim deserves to be developed and discussed further, and 
logically the “transnational historical bloc” is formed by the national (domestic) 
historical blocs of a certain regional organization. Bearing in mind that this latter is the 
combination of the dominant modes of production (structure) and the political and 
civil societies (superstructure), it is valid to affirm that choosing integration serves the 
purposes and interests of the hegemon within national borders. But this (international) 
view could easily be confronted with the state-centrism reductionism in international 
relations.   
Another possible transnational historical bloc is a convergence between  
transnational relations of production (structures) interests, which, in a more integrated 
and globalised world, transcend state borders and are merged into regional 
organization commitments (legal and political norms). This is only likely to be 
accomplished in conjunction with the consent of political society (state) and the 
mobilization of civil society (both at the superstructural level). Probably the best 
known case of this is currently under construction by the European Union and its 
international legal personality. Thus the elite convergence of this specific region 
(marked by two world wars in the last century), plus the active participation of state 
and civil society, have led to a sui generis regional organization that is used as model for 
other regionalisms around the world.  
In both cases, the concept of hegemony relies on a collective interest shared by 
the dominant classes. Even though Carnevali stresses the inapplicability of the 
Gramscian concept of historical bloc to the international arena, due its close 
connection with social class (Carnevali, 2005: 48), it is important to mention the 
importance of an emergent transnational class, based on shared capitalist interests. 
Under this conception, the “transnationalization” of historical blocs would follow the 
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natural course of a transnational capitalist class12. Ultimately, the transnational capitalist 
class would embrace the neo-liberalist order as one of its major premises, insofar as an 
elite-driven hegemonic project would be undertaken by certain capitalist groups whose 
intentions are reflected in an enlargement of their sphere of influence through a neo-
liberal order. For example, the capitalist world represented by the Bretton Woods 
system after the Second World War, and then in the 1970s by the readjustment of the 
Trilateral Commission.  
In Gramsci’s theory of hegemony we found not only the importance of the 
formation of a historical bloc but also its influence on (re)ordering (or hierarchizing) 
social relations’ strata. At the international structural level, according to Gramsci, the 
dominant class is measured by the state’s ability to expand its territory, and by its 
economic and military power. However, a last element indicated by Gramsci is the 
“ideological position” (Mezzaroba, 2005: 18-19).  
Finally, the duality of hegemony has to be assessed aiming to identify, 
theoretically, insurgent movements in the present international order. In order to 
tackle this point, Joseph pointed out the need to distinguish a deeper aspect of 
hegemony, enhanced at the structural level, and a surface aspect of hegemony, 
concerned with hegemonic projects and actions (Joseph, 2002: 128). However, the 
study of hegemony and counter-hegemonic projects requires this concept to be seen 
not as a tangible, static object of analysis, but as a complex, intricate, phenomenon of 
interdependent social relations leading to a unique set of interpretations in each case 
studied. As Joseph puts it: 
“Structural hegemony and surface hegemony are two aspects of a continual 
process. Structural hegemony concerns the deep, underlying condition within society 
and the union of the social formation. Surface hegemony concerns the actual 
hegemonic projects that arise out of this situation it represents a manifestation of the 
underlying conditions, albeit, with its own character and dynamics” (Joseph, 2002: 131). 
                                                          
12 Although this is important it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss it in depth. For further 
information about the transnational capitalist class see: Sklair, Leslie (2001), The transnational capitalist 
class, Oxford: Blackwell;  Sklair, Leslie (2002), The transnational capitalist class and global politics: 
deconstructing the corporate-state connection, in International Political Science Review, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
159-174; and Robinson, William and Harris, Jerry (2000), Towards a global ruling class? Globalization 
and the Transnational Capitalist Class, in Science & Society, vol. 64, no 1, pp. 11-54. 
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According to this line of thought, a counter-hegemonic movement should be 
manifest throughout the surface level, but, aiming to re-formulate (or re-hierarchize) 
and alter the reproductive effects of the structural hegemony in the region affected by 
the struggle. Let us take Bhaskar’s concept of power one and power two relations, 
where the first is the “transformative capacity intrinsic to the concept of agency as 
such” and the second is the “possessed, exercised, mobilized, manifest, covert, 
indirect, mediated” relations (Bhaskar apud Joseph, 2002: 134); Joseph analogously 
compared these two conceptualizations of power with the duality of hegemony, where 
the structural and deep aspect of hegemony concerns power one, and the surface level 
matches with the characteristics of the power two. And he concludes that for a 
counter-hegemonic or a hegemonic project to prevail and endure it should accumulate 
the conditions necessary to operate across structural and civil hegemonies, and not 
only within them. 
The concepts of hegemony, along with the concept of (Transnational) Historical 
Bloc, could be translated inside the field of Peace Studies. In this sense, the actual 
configuration of peace within the international system advocates the fostering of 
certain values, namely liberal-democratic ones. Rather than rhetorical, the fostering of 
them presupposes a deep restructuring of fundamental spheres of post-conflict states. 
Most importantly, it presupposes a great amount of control, influence and supervision 
of pivotal processes that surround their populations, which is a biopolitical enterprise 
per excellence. For a further clarification of this, this paper now turns to the delineation 
of the concept of biopolitics. 
 
Foucault’s Biopolitics  
 
From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, Foucault visualizes the 
appearance of a new technology of power that operates on the opposite pole of 
discipline. Therefore, existing at a different level, performing on a distinct scale and 
making use of different instruments, this is a technology of power that does not 
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exclude the former technologies. This technology is biopower.13 Biopower in essence 
is a macro-political power. Whereas discipline is exercised on the individual, biopower 
is exercised on the collectivity having the population as its target (Kelly, 2009: 43). 
Consequently, this is a technology of power that is not concerned with the individual 
wo/man, but with wo/men as living-beings (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 242). 
In contrast to discipline, biopower is applied “not to man-as-body but to the 
living man, to man-as-living-being” (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 242). As a result, whereas 
discipline is applied to a multiplicity of people because this whole can be divided into 
individuals who can be put under surveillance, series, hierarchies and if necessary be 
punished, biopower acts exactly in the opposite way. It is addressed to a multiplicity of 
people in the sense that “they form a global mass affected by overall process 
characteristics of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” . Therefore, biopower is 
a technology that is exercised not over the individual body, as in discipline, but is 
fundamentally exercised over the populations’ life. Consequently, rather than an 
“anatomo-politics of the human body” what is perceived is the emergence of a 
“biopolitics of the human race” . 
Biopolitics is concerned with “the management of the phenomena that 
characterize groups of living human beings” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003: 6). Hence, it is 
“a form of politics that entails the administration of the process of life at the aggregate 
level of population” (Duffield, 2007: 5). The emergence of such power designates 
precisely “the moment at which the complex phenomena of human existence were 
submitted to the calculation and order of knowledge and power” (Smart, 2002: 99). 
Hence, biopolitics starts to problematize a whole set of phenomena that bind 
population together, that makes it a coherent whole. It problematizes all the “the 
mechanisms of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes” (Foucault, 
[1976] 1978: 139). In essence, biopolitics aims at the “the management and regulation 
of the population, the species body and its demographic characteristics” (Smart, 2002: 
99).  
Consequently, this new regulatory power is concerned essentially with “the 
problem of governing groups of humans represented in the form of population” 
                                                          
13 This concept has been developed differently by contemporary philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben 
(1998), Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000). For a contrast of theirs and Foucault’s use, see 
(Rabinow and Rose, 2006). 
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(Duffield, 2007: 6). As a result of that, biopolitics problematizes and rationalizes the 
whole set of processes surrounding the populations’ life intervening in phenomena 
such as birth, death, production, working conditions, nutrition, illness, fertility, health, 
employment, life expectancy, housing, education, standards of living, and so on, and 
with all the conditions that surround and might have an influence on them (Duffield, 
2007: 6; Foucault, [1976] 1978: 139). Therefore, biopolitics acts in two directions, not 
only at the life-supporting processes per se, but also at the surrounding conditions that 
influence those processes and at the milieu and environment where they develop 
(Foucault, [1976] 1978: 139). Ultimately, biopolitics acts where, and is concerned with, 
the “processes that sustain or retard the optimization of the life of a population” 
(Dean, 2010: 119). 
This makes also the essence of biopolitics different from previous technologies 
of power. Whereas other technologies of power, like discipline for instance, has as its 
ultimate goal to correct, biopolitics targets the life-supporting processes in order to 
invest and foster populations’ lives. It is a power concerned with life-supporting 
phenomena whose main objective is no longer to discipline but to enable and promote 
life, “to invest life through and through” (Foucault, [1976] 1978: 139). Its ultimate goal 
is to enhance the quality of life and its conditions. Hence, its objective is not to correct 
the individual, but to intervene at the level of the generality of the life-supporting 
phenomena of the population in order to enhance it.  
In this sense, biopolitics can be characterized as a power that aims to improve 
life, a power that either “foster[s] life or disallow[s] it to the point of death” (Foucault, 
[1976] 1978: 138). Therefore, biopolitics is fundamentally a power that seeks to exert 
influence and “control over relations between the human race (…) and their 
environment, the milieu in which they live” (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 245). In fact, it is 
precisely through the exercise of power over the life-supporting processes of 
populations that biopolitics seeks to control processes of ‘man-as-living-being’ so, as a 
result, its essential objective can be achieved – the management and regularization of 
population’s lives (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 247). 
To intervene in such a way, and to accomplish that, biopolitics makes use of a 
whole set of instruments, mechanisms, techniques and institutions than might differ 
from discipline. In order to intervene in life-supporting process and their environment, 
this happens through the implementation of a whole set of instruments and institutions 
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that ensure the enhancement of vital processes of the population. Whereas discipline 
is only possible “thanks to a whole system of surveillance, hierarchies, inspections, 
bookkeeping, and reports” (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 242), biopolitics is rendered 
operational through both the installation of security mechanisms around the random 
elements in which a population is embedded and the implementation of apparatuses of 
security which seek to optimizes life. Conventionally, mechanisms and apparatuses of 
security could be cameras, alarms, armies, police forces or intelligence services. 
However, for Foucault, they cover “all the practices and institutions that ensure the 
optimal and proper functioning of the economic, vital and social processes that are 
found to exist within that population and would thus also include health, welfare and 
education systems” (Dean, 2010: 29). Therefore, on the one hand, in regards to 
instruments, biopolitics employs, for instance, “forecasts, statistical estimates, and 
overall measures”  and “techniques of mass surveillance, such as the census, and of 
mass control, such as health campaigns” (Kelly, 2009: 43). On the other hand, in 
regards of institutions, biopolitics is rendered operational, for instance, through the 
implementation, for instance, of health, education, welfare, employment or food 
systems (Dean, 2010: 29). 
Since the objective is to intervene at the generality level of the phenomena, 
apart from those instruments and institutions, biopolitics makes also use of the notion 
of average. It is through the establishment of averages and targets that biopolitics seeks 
to maintain an equilibrium which offsets deviations and therefore its power is 
exercised. After all, it is only after the establishment of averages and targets that one 
can think that “the mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life expectancy has to 
be increased; [or] the birth rate has to be stimulated” (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 246). It 
is only after the process of establishing targets that the life-supporting processes can 
be shaped and, as a consequence, a power over the population’s lives be exercised. 
It is through the process of establishing targets and averages throughout several 
and distinct population’s life-supporting processes that biopolitics takes control of the 
vital processes of ‘man-as-species’. As a result of that, life can be fostered and 
consequently managed, so life ends up being regularized (Foucault, [1976] 2003: 247) 
and, in the end, and most importantly, normalized. At this point the ‘norm’ also plays a 
key role since it circulates between both discipline and biopolitics. It is in light of the 
‘norm’ that discipline and biopolitics operate. As Foucault properly remembers, “[t]he 
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norm is something that can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a 
population one wishes to regularize” . 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper seeks to set draws some insights related the possibility of combining 
both conceptual tools in order to analyze the construction of peace in the 
international scenario. Departing from theoretical developments advanced by Antonio 
Gramsci and Michel Foucault, it is quite possible to reproblematize current 
peacebuilding efforts as an endeavor that, rather than being directed towards the 
proper reconstruction of post-conflict states and empowering their populations, seeks 
to advance a certain view of the world. It is fairly possible to understand these 
practices as another instrument of fostering a determinate range of values. Therefore, 
the construction of peace might be framed as an instrument of fostering and sustaining 
hegemony throughout the globe; this being rendered operational through the exercise 
of biopolitics over post-conflict populations, which is accomplished through 
restructuring the economic, political and social spheres in post-conflict states. 
 Thus, the actual configuration of international system in terms of peace relies 
upon the construction of a concept of peace, operacionalized by the United Nations 
instruments (peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations), that aims to maintain a 
liberal international order. Hence, we may conclude that both approaches, Gramscian 
and Foucaultian accordingly, are prone to better understand how these missions are 
important to achieve a certain degree of consensus among its states members 
(hegemony), operating by the UN’s regulations (biopolitics) in locus, e.g., at the 
periphery of international system.  
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